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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










GEORGE DFOUNI,  
                                Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.N.J. Crim. No. 2-18-cr-00028-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2021 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




After pleading guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion, George Dfouni was ordered to 
pay restitution to Amsterdam Hospitality Group (AHG). Later, Dfouni filed a motion for 
restitution offset and requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether AHG, 
through a settlement agreement with third parties, had been compensated for some of the 
losses he caused. The District Court denied Dfouni’s motion and declined to hold an 
evidentiary hearing. Dfouni filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court also 
denied. Dfouni appeals the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. 
To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the party seeking reconsideration must 
show “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence that was not available when the court [made its initial determination on the 
underlying motion]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.” United States ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 
837, 848–49 (3d Cir. 2014). In support of his motion for reconsideration, Dfouni failed to 
make any of these showings. Accordingly, we will affirm.  
II 
Dfouni pleaded guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion. As part of his plea agreement, 
he agreed to pay full restitution—$7,857,681 to the Internal Revenue Service and 
$13,807,034 to the victim of the wire fraud, AHG. At sentencing, the District Court 
ordered Dfouni to pay restitution consistent with the plea agreement. At that time, Dfouni 
expressed his belief that AHG had entered into a settlement agreement with third parties 
through which AHG may have been compensated for some of the losses Dfouni caused. 
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Dfouni stated that this settlement agreement might entitle him to a credit against his 
restitution obligation. He subpoenaed the confidential settlement agreement, and AHG 
filed a motion to quash. A Magistrate Judge reviewed the settlement agreement in 
camera, denied AHG’s motion to quash, and issued a protective order granting Dfouni 
access to the settlement agreement. 
After reviewing the agreement, Dfouni filed a motion for a restitution offset, in 
which he requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether “[m]onies received in a 
settlement agreement related to the instant offense would require an offset” under the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). App. 55–56 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2020)). Dfouni did not attach the settlement agreement to his motion 
and did not summarize its terms for the court. In his motion, he admitted that he was 
unable to determine whether or not AHG had been compensated for losses he caused. 
On September 12, 2019, the District Court denied Dfouni’s motion for a restitution 
offset and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Dfouni did not appeal that order, but on 
October 11, 2019, he filed a sealed motion for reconsideration to which he attached the 
AHG settlement agreement. In his motion for reconsideration, Dfouni claimed that the 
settlement agreement showed “some manner of payment was made to [AHG]” and that 
this fact alone should be sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. App. 18.  
The court denied Dfouni’s motion for reconsideration because it was based on 
“dissatisfaction and speculation.” App. 19. Additionally, the court stated that Dfouni was 
“merely relitigating along the same grounds as before.” App. 19. This appeal followed. 
III 
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At the outset, the Government contends we lack appellate jurisdiction to review 
the September 12, 2019 order denying Dfouni’s motion for a restitution offset. We agree. 
Dfouni had 14 days to appeal the order denying his motion for an offset, and he failed to 
do so. Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (“In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of 
appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after . . . the entry of . . . the order 
being appealed[.]”).  
And while Dfouni did file a motion for reconsideration of the September 12, 2019 
order, the motion for reconsideration did not toll his time to appeal the order denying his 
motion for an offset. The motion for reconsideration was filed October 11, 2019, outside 
of Rule 4(b)’s 14-day deadline for appeals. A motion for reconsideration filed outside of 
the appeal period will not prevent the appeal period from elapsing. United States v. Kalb, 
891 F.3d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 2018).  
We proceed to exercise our appellate jurisdiction only over Dfouni’s timely appeal 
of the order denying his motion for reconsideration.1 
 
1  The Government contends Dfouni forfeited his right to appeal the court’s denial of 
his motion for reconsideration because his appellate brief focused on the underlying order 
denying his motion for a restitution offset. We disagree. 
Dfouni’s Notice of Appeal specified he was appealing the February 28, 2020 order 
denying his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, an appeal from a denial of a motion 
for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for review.” McAlister v. Sentry 
Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552–53 (3d Cir. 1992). Dfouni did not forfeit his challenge to the 
court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. 
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IV 
We “review[] a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but 
we review the District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and factual 
determinations for clear error.” Schumann, 769 F.3d at 848 (quoting Howard Hess Dental 
Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
Dfouni’s motion for reconsideration requested the court reconsider its order 
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing and motion for a restitution offset. As 
noted, to prevail on a motion for reconsideration the party seeking reconsideration must 
show “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence that was not available when the court [made its initial determination on the 
underlying motion]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.” Id. at 848–49. We conclude Dfouni failed to make any of these 
showings, and thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dfouni’s motion for 
reconsideration. 
In support of his motion for reconsideration, Dfouni did not rely on any 
intervening change in law. He also failed to provide any new evidence. Although he 
attached the settlement agreement he claimed might provide a basis for a restitution 
offset, this did not qualify as new evidence—Dfouni obtained the settlement agreement 
prior to submitting his motion for restitution offset. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., 602 
F.3d at 252 (“[N]ew evidence in this context means evidence that a party could not earlier 
submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.”). 
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The only remaining question is whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
finding there was no “need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice” resulting from its denial of Dfouni’s request for an evidentiary hearing and 
motion for restitution offset. See Schumann, 769 F.3d at 849. We will address the court’s 
denial of Dfouni’s specific request for an evidentiary hearing before addressing its denial 
of Dfouni’s motion for restitution offset. 
A 
The court’s decision to deny Dfouni’s request for an evidentiary hearing was not 
based on any clear error of law or fact and did not result in manifest injustice. “The 
sentencing guidelines and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that a 
district court conduct an evidentiary hearing in addition to a sentencing hearing at which 
the parties can be heard.” United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 562 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Because there is no general right to an evidentiary hearing, the district court has 
discretion to determine whether to afford one. Id. 
We have previously considered whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying an evidentiary hearing where a defendant’s request was based on “speculation” 
that a Fourth Amendment violation might be discovered if the facts of his arrest were 
clarified. United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2010). We held that the 
district court properly exercised its discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing, because the 
defendant “essentially requested a hearing so that [he] could explore whether facts 
existed that would justify a hearing in the first place.” Id. 
7 
Here, like the defendant in Hines, Dfouni requested an evidentiary hearing based 
on speculation and a desire to explore whether facts existed that would justify a hearing 
in the first place. Throughout the proceedings below, Dfouni contended “a restitution 
offset may be appropriate” because the settlement agreement proves “some manner of 
payment was made to [AHG].” App. 18. Yet Dfouni admitted he was unable to link any 
payment AHG received to conduct related to his wire fraud. 
 Because there is no general right to an evidentiary hearing and Dfouni’s request 
was based on speculation that the settlement agreement may have compensated AHG for 
some of the losses he caused, the District Court was within its discretion to deny Dfouni’s 
request. This denial was not based on any clear error of law or fact and did not result in 
manifest injustice. 
B 
The court’s decision to deny Dfouni’s motion for restitution offset was not based 
on any clear error of law or fact and did not result in manifest injustice. The MVRA 
provides that disputes over restitution “shall be resolved by the court by the 
preponderance of the evidence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). The MVRA places the burden on 
the Government to establish the amount of loss the victim suffered, and on the defendant 
to show the defendant’s financial resources. Id. The MVRA then provides that “[t]he 
burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems appropriate shall be upon 
the party designated by the court as justice requires.” Id. Where a defendant claims 
entitlement to a restitution offset, the burden falls on the defendant to prove that 
reduction in restitution is appropriate. See United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d 
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Cir. 2011) (“[W]here offsets are claimed, such as for compensation that the victim gets 
from other sources, other Courts of Appeals have concluded that it is the defendant’s 
burden to prove those offsets.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Sizemore, 
850 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he burden of proving an offset should lie with the 
defendant.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 
358, 365 (5th Cir. 2001) (“It is the defendant’s burden to establish an offset to a 
restitution order.”); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
burden of establishing this double payment is on the defendant.”). 
The court properly put the burden on Dfouni to prove entitlement to a restitution 
offset. Dfouni did not meet that burden. He did not attach the settlement agreement to his 
motion for restitution offset. Instead, he merely asserted that after review of the 
settlement agreement, it “appear[ed] likely” AHG had been compensated for some of the 
losses he caused. App. 56. These bald assertions failed to establish that the settlement 
agreement related to the same harm caused by Dfouni’s criminal conduct. Accordingly, 
the court did not err in determining Dfouni did not meet his burden under the MVRA, 
and no injustice resulted from its denial of Dfouni’s motion for restitution offset. 
Because the court made no errors of law or fact in denying Dfouni’s motion for 
restitution offset and request for an evidentiary hearing, and Dfouni did not rely on new 
evidence or an intervening change in law, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Dfouni’s motion for reconsideration. 
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V 
For the reasons provided, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Dfouni’s 
motion for reconsideration. 
